There have been several interesting neurolaw-related papers posted recently on SSRN. So, I have decided to start a new series of posts that will contain links to the ones that I find to be particularly illuminating. For now, here is the first installment:
Dave Marcotte and Sara Markowitz, "A Cure for Crime? Psycho-Pharmaceuticals and Crime Trends."
Abstract:
In
this paper we consider possible links between the advent and diffusion
of a number of new psychiatric pharmaceutical therapies and crime
rates. We describe recent trends in crime and review the evidence
showing mental illness as a clear risk factor both for criminal
behavior and victimization. We then briefly summarize the development
of a number of new pharmaceutical therapies for the treatment of mental
illness which diffused during the "great American crime decline." We
examine limited international data, as well as more detailed American
data to assess the relationship between crime rates and rates of
prescriptions of the main categories of psychotropic drugs, while
controlling for other factors which may explain trends in crime rates.
We find that increases in prescriptions for psychiatric drugs in
general are associated with decreases in violent crime, with the
largest impacts associated with new generation antidepressants and
stimulants used to treat ADHD. Our estimates imply that about 12
percent of the recent crime drop was due to expanded mental health
treatment.
Michael Perlin, "And I Can See Through Your Brain: Access to Experts, Competency to Consent, and the Implact of Antipsychootic Medications in Neuroimaging Cases in the Criminal Trial Process."
Abstract:
This
paper considers the implications of neuroimaging in three under
discussed aspects of criminal procedure - the implications of Ake v.
Oklahoma (an indigent defendant's access to expert testimony) in cases
where neuroimaging tests might be critical, (2) the defendant's
competency to consent to the imposition of a neuroimaging test or
examination; and (3) the impact of medications - specifically,
antipsychotic medications - on a defendant's brain at the time that
such a test is performed. Given the warning signals that have
been raised by commentators as to the potentiality of juror misuse and
misinterpretation of neuroimaging testimony, it is critical that we
take seriously the issues raised here. I conclude that there are hidden
landmines inevitably present when we think about the use of
neuroimaging in criminal trials - landmines that go can infect the
fairness of the trial process itself. If an indigent criminal
defendant is refused access to an independent expert in an area where
jurors may uncritically accept neuroimaging testimony (because of its
visual appeal and its apparent lack of falsifiability), the fairness of
the entire trial remains in question. If no attention is paid to the
difficult and complex ethical issues that should surface if the
question of the defendant's competency to consent to being tested is
not raised, trial fairness is a concern. And finally, if we ignore the
reality that the neuroimaging evidence shown to jurors may not be an
accurate depiction of the defendant's brain at the time of the offense
- but rather, a depiction of his brain at a later time when his brain
biochemistry has been altered by the imposition of medication - we
willfully blind ourselves to the possibility (perhaps "likelihood")
that the database presented to the jury is potentially fatally flawed.
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