Kerri Smith
Nature
Scientists think they can prove that free will is an illusion.
Philosophers are urging them to think again.
Smith, Kerri. (2011), Taking Aim at Free Will. Nature: 1 Sept 2011, 477, 23-25.
The Research Network Homepage:
Supported By:
Network Director
- Owen Jones
Director
Legal Notice:
- Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed on this blog are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation or of Vanderbilt University.
Free Will
09/06/2011
08/05/2011
04/11/2011
11/30/2010
09/29/2010
03/14/2010
01/25/2010
Neuro-criticisms by Raymond Tallis
Raymond Tallis has made it abundantly clear that he doesn't like the recent trend towards research at the cross-roads of neuroscience and the humanities. In a series of sensational editorials, he has derided what he uncharitably refers to as "neuro-trash" and "neuro-mythology." I, for one, think that his arguments tend to shed far more heat than light. Minimally, Tallis' frequently commits what I have called the fallacy of composition when it comes to the field of neurolaw. As such, I plan to post a few responses in the weeks ahead. In the meantime, I thought I would provide readers with links to some of the things he has written about the relationship between neuroscience and the humanities in the past few years.
Excerpt:
In summary, such are the limitations of our understanding of the brain, attempting to apply the findings of neuroscience to social policy would be premature, even if this were not wrong in principle. But it is wrong in principle. The fabric of the human world, of the public space that is the arena of our lives, is woven out of explicit shared attention that has been infinitely elaborated in a way that has little to do with what goes on in the darkness of the individual skull, though you require a brain in working order in order to be part of it. If you come across a new discipline with the prefix “neuro” and it is not to do with the nervous system itself, switch on your bullshit detector. If it has society in its sights, reach for your gun. Bring on the neurosceptics.
"Why Blame Me? It Was All My Brain's Fault."
Excerpt:
Meanwhile, the neuromitigation of blame has to be treated with suspicion
except in those instances where there is unambiguous evidence of grossly
abnormal brain function or abnormal mental function due to clearcut illness
that may have its origin in brain disease. Our knowledge of the relationship
between brain and consciousness, brain and self, and brain and agency is so
weak and so conceptually confused that the appeal to neuroscience in the law
courts, the police station or anywhere else is premature and usually
inappropriate. And, I would suggest, it will remain both premature and
inappropriate. Neurolaw is just another branch of neuromythology.
Excerpt:
Our failure to explain consciousness in terms of neural activity inside the brain inside the skull is not due to technical limitations which can be overcome. It is due to the self-contradictory nature of the task, of which the failure to explain "aboutness", the unity and multiplicity of our awareness, the explicit presence of the past, the initiation of actions, the construction of self are just symptoms. We cannot explain "appearings" using an objective approach that has set aside appearings as unreal and which seeks a reality in mass/energy that neither appears in itself nor has the means to make other items appear. The brain, seen as a physical object, no more has a world of things appearing to it than does any other physical object.
(*) This piece is not specifically about neurolaw, but it is based on assumptions that inform Tallis' so-called neuro-skepticism.
It appears both Tallis' strategy and his rhetoric are catching on, as evidenced by this recent piece by Denyse O'Leary over at Mertcator.net:
Excerpt:
I'd like to propose a radical idea. Why don't the neuroscientists and progressive humanists stop hyperventilating and chill out for a while. Let them reflect on the fact that a hundred years ago phrenology, the "science" of analysing behaviour by putting a tape measure around a skull, was all the rage. Until they can account for the difference between the mind and the brain, their research might not be worth a hill of beans. In fact, it might just be, in the words of Raymond Tallis, neo-phrenology.
09/16/2009
Erickson on Blaming the Brain
I just came across this recent article by Steve Erickson entitled "Blaming the Brain." Erickson also discusses his views over at the Crime and Consequences blog. Here is the abstract for his paper:
***
Criminal
law scholarship has recently become absorbed with the ideas of
neuroscience in the emerging field of neurolaw. This mixture of
cognitive neuroscience and law suggests that long established
conceptions of human agency and responsibility are fundamentally at
odds with the findings of science. Using sophisticated technology,
cognitive neuroscience claims to be upon the threshold of unraveling
the mysteries of the mind by elucidating the mechanical nature of the
brain. Despite the limitations of that technology, neurolaw supporters
eagerly suggest that those revelations entail that an inevitable and
radical overhaul of our criminal justice system is soon at hand. What
that enthusiasm hides, however, is a deeper ambition among those who
desire an end to distributive punishment based on desert in favor of a
prediction model heavily influenced by the behavioral sciences. That
model rests squarely on the presumption that science should craft crime
policy at the expense of the authority of common intuitions of justice.
But that exchange has profound implications for how the law views
criminal conduct and responsibility - and how it should be sanctioned
under the law. Neurolaw promises a more humane and just criminal
justice system, yet there is ample reason to believe otherwise.
***
I am always a bit skeptical when the critics of neurolaw treat the nascent field as if it were a monolithic entity. Take, for instance, the 40+ fellows and post-docs who make up the Law and Neuroscience Project (LANP). Given the way critics often talk about "the" field of neurolaw, one would think the LANP would have attracted an ideologically homogeneous group of radicals and revolutionaries who are determined to transform the criminal law. In fact, however, LANP is composed of people from a variety of disciplines who have wide ranging views concerning the transformative potential (or lack thereof) of neuroscience. In practice, neurolaw is a field that includes both those who think neuroscience will radically alter the criminal law (e.g., Joshua Greene) and those who think neuroscience will have a much narrower effect on our notions of agency and responsibility (e.g., Stephen Morse). Moving forward, I think the heterogeneous nature of the growing field of neurolaw needs to be kept in mind by both critics and advocates alike.
09/03/2009
The Secret Politics of the Compatibilist Criminal Law
I recently stumbled upon a really provocative paper by Anders Kaye entitled, "The Secret Politics of the Compatibilist Criminal Law."
Given that one of the key issues addressed in the paper is whether
compatibilist theories of free will--which focus very heavily on
dispositional traits and conscious mental states--can accommodate
situational forces that are criminogenic (e.g., poverty and early
childhood abuse). According to Kaye, compatibilist theories of free
will and responsibility have been used by some criminal theorists to shield the criminal law from developments in behavioral science,
criminology, etc. that might otherwise lead to a less punitive justice
system as well as a more egalitarian society. In short, Kaye suggests
that compatibilism is not a "politically innocent" theory of free
will. Here is the abstract:
Many criminal theorists say that we have a 'compatibilist' criminal law, by which they mean that in our criminal law a person can deserve punishment for her acts even if she does not have 'genuinely' free will. This conception of the criminal law harbors and is driven by a secret politics, one that resists social change and idealizes the existing social order. In this Article, I map this secret politics. In so doing, I call into question the descriptive accuracy of the compatibilist account of the criminal law, and set the stage for a franker discussion of criminal punishment - one that recognizes that the perpetual struggle to say just who 'deserves' punishment is driven as much by brute politics and the competition to allocate power and resources in society as by any independent moral logic.
There is already a heated debate about Kaye's novel line of reasoning over at The Garden of Forking Paths. However, it would be nice to see an active comment thread here at The Law and Neuroscience Blog as well. So, please take a look at the paper and then give us your thoughts!
