The Law and Neuroscience Blog

Taking Aim at Free Will

Kerri Smith
Nature

Scientists think they can prove that free will is an illusion.
Philosophers are urging them to think again.

Smith, Kerri. (2011), Taking Aim at Free Will. Nature: 1 Sept 2011, 477, 23-25.

9th Cir. Conference includes Neurolaw Expert Panel

Four neurolaw experts spoke on “The Promises and Perils of Neuroscience Evidence in the Courtroom” at the Annual Conference of the U.S. Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit, in Carlsbad, California, on August 16, 2011.  The panel included Professors Owen Jones (Vanderbilt), Nita Farahany (Vanderbilt), Stephen Morse (Pennsylvania) and Hank Greely (Stanford).  Before a large audience that included the Hon. Anthony Kennedy, Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Hon. Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge of the 9^th Circuit, the panelists provided a brief introduction to law-relevant neuroscience, summarized the growing use of neuroscientific evidence in the courtroom, and addressed both the benefits and pitfalls of trying to use such evidence to inform legal decision-making.

The Brain on Trial

David M. Eagleman
Baylor College of Medicine

This article summarizes several difficulties with the current system of criminal justice. It begins with several examples to clarify the relationship between biology and behavior, identifies problems with the assumption that all brains are created equal, argues for a forward-looking justice system, describes new opportunities from neuroscience for rehabilitation, and offers a roadmap to achieve a more tailored, customized, neurally-compatible system of sentencing.

Eagleman, David M. (2011), The Brain on Trial. Atlantic Monthy: Jul/Aug 2011, 308:1, 112-123.

"Neuroimage Evidence and the Insanity Defense"

N.J. Schweitzer and Michael J. Saks
Arizona State University

Abstract:

The introduction of neuroscientific evidence in criminal trials has given rise to fears that neuroimagery presented by an expert witness might inordinately influence jurors' evaluations of the defendant. In this experiment, a diverse sample of 1,170 community members from throughout the U.S. evaluated a written mock trial in which psychological, neuropsychological, neuroscientific, and neuroimage-based expert evidence was presented in support of a not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) defense. No evidence of an independent influence of neuroimagery was found. Overall, neuroscience-based evidence was found to be more persuasive than psychological and anecdotal family history evidence. These effects were consistent across different insanity standards. Despite the non-influence of neuroimagery, however, jurors who were not provided with a neuroimage indicated that they believed neuroimagery would have been the most helpful kind of evidence in their evaluations of the defendant. 

Schweitzer, N. J. and Saks, M. J. (2011), Neuroimage Evidence and the Insanity Defense. Behavioral Sciences & the Law.

Justice Breyer cites neuroscience research in videogame dissent

 
 
Hon. Stephen G. Breyer: “[c]utting-edge neuroscience has shown that ‘virtual violence in video game playing results in those neural patterns that are considered characteristic for aggressive cognition and behavior’”

 

 

The U.S. Supreme Court recently invalidated (7-2) a California law that banned the sale of violent videogames to children.  The majority, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, held in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Assoc., that videogames were subject to First Amendment “speech” protection.  In dissent, Justice Breyer noted that “[c]utting-edge neuroscience has shown that ‘virtual violence in video game playing results in those neural patterns that are considered characteristic for aggressive cognition and behavior.’” He argued the Court should defer, for this reason among others, to the elected legislature’s conclusion that the videogames in question were likely to harm children.  

The Antisocial Person

The Annals of General Psychiatry has a nice review piece entitled, "The 'antisocial' person: an insight in to biology, classification and current evidence on treatment."

Abstract

Background: This review analyses and summarises the recent advances in understanding the neurobiology of violence and empathy, taxonomical issues on defining personality disorders characterised by disregard for social norms, evidence for efficacy of different treatment modalities and ethical implications in defining 'at-risk' individuals for preventive interventions.

Methods: PubMed was searched with the keywords 'antisocial personality disorder', 'dissocial personality disorder' and 'psychopathy'. The search was limited to articles published in English over the last 10 years (1999 to 2009)

Results: Both diagnostic manuals used in modern psychiatry, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual published by the American Psychiatric Association and the International Classification of Diseases published by the World Health Organization, identify a personality disorder sharing similar traits. It is termed antisocial personality disorder in the diagnostic and statistical manual and dissocial personality disorder in the International Classification of Diseases. However, some authors query the ability of the existing manuals to identify a special category termed 'psychopathy', which in their opinion deserves special attention. On treatment-related issues, many psychological and behavioural therapies have shown success rates ranging from 25% to 62% in different cohorts. Multisystemic therapy and cognitive behaviour therapy have been proven efficacious in many trials. There is no substantial evidence for the efficacy of pharmacological therapy. Currently, the emphasis is on early identification and prevention of antisocial behaviour despite the ethical implications of defining at-risk children.Conclusions: Further research is needed in the areas of neuroendocrinological associations of violent behaviour, taxonomic existence of psychopathy and efficacy of treatment modalities.

Scientific Advances and the Death Penalty

The Wall Street Journal Law Blog has an interesting piece on science and the death penalty.  Here is a brief excerpt:

Will scientific advances ultimately spell doom for capital punishment?

That’s the question raised by this piece over at the Arizona Republic, which examined a recent conference at Arizona State that looked at advances in neuroscience and genetics — and how they might help explain criminal behavior.

The thought goes like this: A better understanding of criminal behavior might ultimately lead society to show more compassion for those who suffer from the genetic defects that lead them to kill, maim, or commit other criminal acts.

“There is a ton of new science coming forward in both genetics and neuroscience that describe the brain in a way that leads to a predisposition to violent behavior,” said Gary Marchant, the executive director of the Center for Law, Science & Innovations at Arizona State University’s Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law. In the not-to-distant future, predicts Marchant, science will kill the death penalty.

Happy reading!

MAOA and Criminal Responsibility

Matthew Baum has a new piece in Neuroethics entitled, "The MAOA Predisposition to Impulsive Violence: Is it Relevant to Criminal Trials?"  

Here is the abstract:

In Italy, a judge reduced the sentence of a defendant by 1 year in response to evidence for a genetic predisposition to violence. The best characterized of these genetic differences, those in the monoamine oxidase A (MAOA), were cited as especially relevant. Several months previously in the USA, MAOA data contributed to a jury reducing charges from 1st degree murder (a capital offence) to voluntary manslaughter. Is there a rational basis for this type of use of MAOA evidence in criminal court? This paper will review in context recent work on the MAOA gene–environment interaction in predisposing individuals to violence and address the relevance of such findings to murder trials. Interestingly, the MAOA genetic variants impact future violence and aggression only when combined with the adverse environmental stimuli of childhood maltreatment. Thus nature and nurture interact to determine the individual’s risk. Based on current evidence, I argue there is a weak case for mitigation. But should future experiments confirm the hypothesis that individual differences in impulse control and response to provocation found in MAOA-L men (without abuse) are significantly magnified when combined with childhood maltreatment, the case could turn into a stronger one.

 

Malintent Detection and the Spectre of Pre-Crime

Nature News has a recent piece on developing technologies for detecting "malintent."  Here is an excerpt:

"Planning a sojourn in the northeastern United States? You could soon be taking part in a novel security programme that can supposedly 'sense' whether you are planning to commit a crime.

Future Attribute Screening Technology (FAST), a US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) programme designed to spot people who are intending to commit a terrorist act, has in the past few months completed its first round of field tests at an undisclosed location in the northeast, Nature has learned.

Like a lie detector, FAST measures a variety of physiological indicators, ranging from heart rate to the steadiness of a person's gaze, to judge a subject's state of mind. But there are major differences from the polygraph. FAST relies on non-contact sensors, so it can measure indicators as someone walks through a corridor at an airport, and it does not depend on active questioning of the subject.

The tactic has drawn comparisons with the science-fiction concept of 'pre-crime', popularized by the film Minority Report, in which security services can detect someone's intention to commit a crime. Unlike the system in the film, FAST does not rely on a trio of human mutants who can see the future. But the programme has attracted copious criticism from researchers who question the science behind it."

Check out the original article for the rest of the story!

 

Neuroscientific Challenges to Retributivism

Michael Pardo and Dennis Patterson have a new piece entitled, "Neuroscientific Challenges to Retributivism" that is scheduled to appear in a forthcoming volume that I am editing for Oxford University Press entitled The Future of Punishment.

Abstract:      
We examine two recent challenges to retribution-based justifications for criminal punishment based on neuroscientific evidence. The first seeks to undermine retributivism because of the brain activity of subjects engaged in punishment decisions for retributive (as opposed to consequentialist) reasons. This challenge proceeds by linking retributivism with deontological moral theories and the brain activity correlated with deontological moral judgments. The second challenge seeks to undermine retributivism by exposing, through neuroscientific information, the purportedly implausible foundation on which retributivism depends: one based on free will and folk psychology. 

We conclude that neither challenge succeeds. The first challenge fails, in part, because the brain activity of punishers does not provide the appropriate criteria for whether judgments regarding criminal punishment are justified or correct. Moreover, retributivism does not necessarily depend on the success or failure of any particular moral theory. The second challenge fails because neuroscience does not undermine the conceptions of free will or folk psychology on which retributivism depends. Along the way, we point out a number of faulty inferences and problematic assumptions and presuppositions involved in these challenges to retributivism.